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Let us call a halt to this imaginary
dialogue [between Karl Marx and Joseph
Schumpeter] and return to the main sub-
ject at hand: the neglect of entrepreneur-
ship in modern, mainstream economics.
Surely, this neglect must give us pause? It
is a scandal that nowadays students of eco-
nomics can spend years in the study of the
subject before hearing the term “entrepre-
neur,” that courses in economic develop-
ment provide exhaustive lists of all the
factors impeding or accelerating economic
growth without mentioning the conditions
under which entrepreneurship languishes
or flourishes, and the learned compari-
sons between “socialism” and “capitalism”
are virtually silent about the role of
entrepreneurship under regimes of col-
lective rather than private ownership.
—Marc Blaug (1986, 229)
Some of the simplest questions often
asked about economic performance have the
most complex answers. Three examples: How
can profit exist? What causes economic growth?
How does a market economy coordinate
resource use? Over the long history of the devel-
opment of economic doctrine, many great
minds have wrestled with these questions and
many have turned to the concept of the entre-
preneur. This term has long been used by econ-
omists, albeit with varying emphases at different
times, and recently enjoyed a renaissance in
economic and business school pedagogy be-
cause of the Internet’s evolution and the small-
business explosion it generated. The concept
remains relevant as America’s economy enters
the new millennium, for how we treat our entre-
preneurs has immediate and profound effects
on our overall national economic performance
and the direction of economic activity.
According to modern economic theory, an
entrepreneur is an individual who takes on cer-
tain tasks based solely on a perception of mar-
ket opportunities and how to exploit them. This
person is, to varying degrees, a risk taker, re-
source manager, innovator, arbitrager, and both
creator and destroyer. Entrepreneurship is not
planning by groups or management decisions
by corporate bodies, but the exploitation of per-
ceived opportunity by individuals based solely
on personal judgments and visions that others
either don’t see or can’t bear the risks of acting
on. It was entrepreneurs who created the New
Economy. The story of who they were and how
they did it is more enlightening than anything
pure theory can offer on this topic.
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But theory remains integral to understand-
ing, and so theorists are appealing more often
to the idea of entrepreneurship and the role of
entrepreneurs as explanatory variables for eco-
nomic reality. It is useful to look at the histori-
cal development of this concept. Only by study-
ing the past can we expect to understand the
present.
THE HISTORY OF A CONCEPT
Beginnings—The Physiocrats
Most historians of economic thought date
the genesis of modern economic theory to the
early eighteenth century in France, where a
group of thinkers called the Physiocrats
emerged. The most famous among them was
Richard Cantillon (1680–1734), whose 1755 work
Essai sur la nature du commerce en general
(written between 1730 and 1734) first intro-
duced the concept of the entrepreneur into eco-
nomic analysis (Spengler 1960). The concept
itself had been used before Cantillon’s time,
however, to mean various things. One writer
has summarized its history as follows:
The most general and probably the
earliest meaning of the word entrepre-
neur is celui qui entreprend, which
means an active person with initiative.
The word originates in the verb entre-
prendre, which has a meaning similar to
“getting things done.” Up unto the six-
teenth century entrepreneur meant: (1)
grasp, take hold of (saisir) (2) surprise,
discover (surprendre).
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The term seems to have evolved in the fif-
teenth century and was applied to people who
ran risks, especially during wars. By the six-
teenth century, the term was being applied to “a
large scale businessman who contracted to sup-
ply, having taken upon himself the responsibil-
ity to combine the factors of production at his
own expense and risk.”
3 As Rothbard (1995a,
351) writes about Cantillon’s analysis:
Thus Cantillon divides producers
in the market economy into two classes:
“hired people” who receive fixed wages,
or fixed land rents, and entrepreneurs
with non-fixed, uncertain returns. The
farmer–entrepreneur bears the risk of
fixed costs of production and of uncer-
tain selling prices, while the merchant or
manufacturer pays similar fixed costs and
relies on an uncertain return. Except for
those who only sell “their own labour,”
business entrepreneurs must lay out
monies which, after they have done so,
are “fixed” or given from their point of
view. Since sales and selling prices are
uncertain and not fixed, their business
income becomes an uncertain residual.
Rothbard also notes that, for Cantillon,
entrepreneurs are equilibrating agents in the
market system. This is in contrast to the analy-
ses of some economists, especially Joseph
Schumpeter, who later came to view entrepre-
neurs as disequilibrating factors.
Immediately after the publication and
wide dissemination of Cantillon’s work—one of
the few works Adam Smith (1723–90) cites in
his magisterial An Inquiry Into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations—a self-con-
scious school of thought arose named “physioc-
racy,” or rule by nature. Although Cantillon’s
Essai came first, the leader of this initial well-
organized economic paradigm was not Cantillon
but François Quesnay (1694–1774). The
Physiocrats flourished for two decades before
Smith published his classic work in political
economy in 1776. Like many early political
economists, Quesnay, a medical physician to
the French court by vocation, studied and wrote
about economics as an avocation.
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Quesnay’s views about entrepreneurs re-
sembled Cantillon’s. Because of the physiocratic
focus on the agricultural sector, Quesnay and
his followers were referring to the land-owning
entrepreneurs who guided food production
when they argued that “the entrepreneur bears
uncertainty, organizes and supervises produc-
tion, introduces new methods and new prod-
ucts, and searches for new markets. In order to
do this properly, he must gain free access to a
wide variety of markets, and he must be able to
rely on the government to provide for him the
utmost freedom of action in his undertakings”
(Hoselitz 1962, 247). The Physiocrats lived in an
age dominated by agriculturally based econo-
mies, the Industrial Revolution’s effects having
only begun to transform the world economic
landscape.
The later French political economists im-
proved upon Cantillon’s analysis of entrepre-
neurial behavior by adding what he had omit-
ted, specifically the relationship between
entrepreneurs and the sources of capital avail-
able for economic innovation. For Cantillon, the
entrepreneur is simply a risk taker under condi-
tions of uncertainty, but for the Physiocrats, and
especially for the partial Physiocrat Anne-Robert-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 4
Jacques Turgot (1727–81), the risks he takes are
often borne out of his own stock of capital.
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This view made sense in a period when finan-
cial markets were crude and institutionally pro-
vided capital was rare.
The French political economist Jean-Baptiste
Say (1767–1832) has been falsely credited as the
first to discuss the entrepreneur’s role in eco-
nomic theory.
6 To be fair to Say, there is no
direct, irrefutable evidence that he appropriated
the ideas of those political economists who pre-
ceded him in France, although some historical
speculation exists (Hoselitz 1962, 248–50). What
is not historically disputed is that the French tra-
dition had a more fully developed and more
sophisticated theory of entrepreneurial activity
than did the British classical counterpart. And
that meant, by logical extension and ex post
empirical confirmations, that the French also
better understood how a capitalist economic
system actually functions. Unfortunately, because
of the international dominance of British writers
and thinkers during the nineteenth century, much
of this knowledge lay dormant, awaiting redis-
covery and elaboration.
The Classical School (1776–1870)
“Entrepreneurs” virtually disappeared from
nineteenth century British political economy.
Adam Smith set the precedent with his hugely
influential  An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, considered the
fountainhead of the entire British classical school
of political economy.
7 Did this mean Smith was
unaware of the role entrepreneurs played or
that he merely lacked a term for them? Some
have claimed that Smith’s view of the “under-
taker” was nothing more than the physiocratic
entrepreneurial model in English terminology
(Elkjaer 1991, 806–7). Others deny that Smith
understood or used the entrepreneur concept at
all (Rothbard 1995b, 25). Smith’s defenders claim
that, for British classical political economy, pro-
duction was a given, and, therefore, the roles of
individual productive factors needed no elabo-
ration. But this won’t do, because Smith and his
successors did discuss the factors of production
and their rates of remuneration in great detail,
all the while excluding any separate role for the
entrepreneur, whose title was replaced by the
all-encompassing term “capitalist” and whose
function became automatic. Schumpeter (1950,
556) is well worth quoting here:
Ricardo, the Ricardians, and also
Senior took indeed no notice of Say’s
suggestion and in fact almost accom-
plished what I have described as an im-
possible feat, namely, the exclusion of the
figure of the entrepreneur completely.
For them—as well as for Marx—the
business process runs substantially by
itself, the one thing needed to make it
run being an adequate supply of capital.
David Ricardo (1772–1823) and his fol-
lowers ought to have built on the early French
insights but didn’t, even though Say’s extensions
were available to them in a translated edition for
more than a decade before Ricardo wrote his
Principles of Political Economy (Hebert and Link
1988).
8 Karl Marx (1818–83) ignored entre-
preneurs altogether because they didn’t fit in
well with his division of all economic reality
into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the
“capitalists” and the “workers.” This seems an
especially large oversight for the man who,
according to Blaug (1997), introduced the con-
cept “technological change” into economic the-
ory, because entrepreneurs are almost always
linked with technical change, and Marx had the
benefit of seeing many such entrepreneurial for-
tunes built on innovative ideas (see Schumpeter
1968, 516).
The only classical school economist who
wrote anything detailed about entrepreneurs
was Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Bentham
disagreed with Smith about usury (Defence of
Usury, 1787), believing that charging interest on
loans was a key part of the innovative process
that entrepreneurs continually create. Except for
this one dissent, the British classical school
remained mostly mute on the topic of entrepre-
neurship between the time of Smith’s early and
narrow writings and John Stuart Mill’s later,
somewhat ambiguous ones.
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Mill (1806–73), arguably the greatest of
the classical economists and the school’s last
major figure, devoted—in a two-volume, 1,000-
plus-page work—but two sentences to the
entrepreneur, illustrating the British classical
school’s final stance on the issue of what entre-
preneurs do and what rewards they might
receive:
These different compensations may
be paid to either the same, or to differ-
ent persons. The capital, or some part of
it, may be borrowed: may belong to
someone who does not undertake the
risks or the trouble of the business. In
that case, the lender or owner is the per-
son who practices the abstinence; and is
remunerated for it by the interest paid to5 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2001
him, while the difference between the
interest and the gross profits remunerates
the exertions and risks of the under-
taker.
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Because classical economists made little of the
distinction between entrepreneurs—who assume
risks, combine productive factors, and explore
the possibilities of innovation—and capitalists
—who merely provide the means for invest-
ment in machines and processes—the early
physiocratic insights and extensions of Say were
mostly ignored during the classical period in
England.
Other Nineteenth Century Economic Thinkers
Austria, Sweden, and Germany produced
many influential, brilliant, and widely read eco-
nomic theoreticians during the nineteenth cen-
tury. Building on the early insights of the
Physiocrats, these thinkers made significant
advances in the theory of the entrepreneur.
Some of the German contributions were made
by J. H. von Thunen (1783–1850), H. K. von
Mangoldt (1824–68), Gottleib Hufeland (1760–
1817), and Adolf Riedel (1809–72). Riedel em-
bellished Cantillon’s view of the entrepreneur,
adding the insight that entrepreneurs reduce
uncertainty for others by taking it on themselves
in the form of fixed-price contracts over time. If
they guess right, they enjoy a surplus or profit;
if not, they suffer a loss. Thunen extended the
distinction between entrepreneurial activity and
mere managerial activity and also brought
together the two views of the entrepreneur in 
the process. Were they risk takers/bearers or
innovators, or both? Thunen argued that they
were both.
Mangoldt brought the element of time into
the equation of risk bearing. In his view, the
longer the productive process, the more uncer-
tain and, hence, riskier would be the entrepre-
neur’s function. Although this seems obvious,
the inclusion of time in economic theory came
slowly. Mangoldt anticipated Frank Knight’s
later distinction between risk and uncertainty.
Thunen, in his The Isolated State (1850), put for-
ward exactly this idea in explaining the rewards
that accrue to entrepreneurs. To quote Blaug
(1986, 222):
The rewards of the entrepreneur,
Thunen went on to say, are therefore the
returns for incurring those risks which no
insurance company will cover because
they are unpredictable. Since novel
action is precisely the condition under
which it is impossible to predict the
probability of gain or loss, the entrepre-
neur is “explorer and inventor” in his
field  par excellence (Hebert and Link,
1988, 45–47).
The classical school came to an end with
the so-called marginal revolution of the early
1870s, and its central doctrines became known
thereafter as neoclassicism (see, for example,
Blaug 1986). During this period, roughly
1880–1910, British and Austrian theoretical out-
put dominated the economics profession by
way of such teachers or writers as Alfred
Marshall (1842–1924), A. C. Pigou (1877–1959),
Carl Menger (1840–1921), and Friedrich von
Wieser (1851–1926). Also important, if not
immediately appreciated, were France’s Leon
Walras (1834–1910) and Sweden’s Knut
Wicksell (1851–1926). These thinkers addressed
numerous issues but didn’t, for the most part,
include any extensions of the theory of entre-
preneurship, although they drew upon previous
work and did discuss the issues surrounding
entrepreneurship extensively (see Wieser 1967,
353–58).
BREAKING NEW GROUND
The economist most closely associated
with the term entrepreneur is, paradoxically, the
theorist who prophesied the entrepreneur’s
obsolescence. Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950),
with his evocative phrase “creative destruction,”
gave the most sophisticated explanation of the
concept.
11 Schumpeter was specific in arguing
that the entrepreneur doesn’t invent things, but
exploits in novel ways what has already been
invented. In combining existing inventions, the
entrepreneur triggers creative destruction and
brings into being new industries even as old ones
are sometimes destroyed. Nor is Schumpeter’s
entrepreneur a risk bearer, for that role is
played, in his view, by the financial intermedi-
ary who lends the funds for the new combina-
tion. Entrepreneurs then, are managers, decid-
ing how resources will be used in a capitalist
economy. They also are destabilizing agents
because they change the existing relations and
techniques of production. They lead the econ-
omy toward a better use of capital and knowl-
edge, which is vital for macroeconomic growth
and rising productivity.
Finally, Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs are
the causes of business cycles because their
actions create dislocations that can come in
waves. Cyclic downturns are characterized bywhat Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) called a
“cluster of errors,” as most entrepreneurs sud-
denly guess wrong. Why? Schumpeter suggests
three reasons: (1) innovative ways of applying
existing inventions and resources immediately
trigger emulation by others; (2) the extra
demand that financial backing gives to these
undertakings is financed by credit-expanding
activities that banks can engage in under a frac-
tional reserve system; (3) the new undertakings
generate  “spillover effects” and trigger similar
dislocations in other industries (Schohl 1999).
Schumpeter emerged from the Austrian tra-
dition, and his business cycle theory as well as
his ideas about entrepreneurs were influenced
by previous work in that tradition. For example,
it was Austrian school founder Menger who first
elaborated that paradigm’s view of entrepreneurs.
According to Menger, entrepreneurs acquire in-
formation, make economic calculations, super-
vise production, and bear risks due to the un-
certainty inherent in all human undertakings.
But surprisingly, he held that the risk bearing
aspect of entrepreneurship is trivial because of
the possibility of profits. Like Menger, Schumpeter
denied that entrepreneurship was primarily about
risk taking (Hebert and Link 1988).
Another Austrian, Wieser, added a charac-
teristic to entrepreneurs: alertness to the oppor-
tunities that surround them. Austrian school 
theorist Israel Kirzner later extended this view
of entrepreneurs, whereas Schumpeter pursued
Menger’s approach. This early work and its later
extension make the Austrians the second orga-
nized economic school—after the Physiocrats—
to work out extensive ideas about entrepreneurs
and their effects on the economy and society.
France’s Walras seems the least likely to
include entrepreneurship prominently in his
models. After all, Walras was the creator of the
modern general equilibrium system—a pillar of
neoclassical economics—which states that
equilibrium is reached by the efforts of an apoc-
ryphal “auctioneer.” Yet Walras allowed a crucial
role for the entrepreneur as one of the major
factors of production, and he was careful to 
distinguish the entrepreneur’s function from 
the capitalist’s. Further, in a disagreement with
his French predecessors, Walras denied that
arranging production was entrepreneurial; it was
merely, in his view, managerial and was remu-
nerated with wages, not profits. Walras had well-
developed views about the role of entrepre-
neurs in the real world, even though they
disappeared in the general equilibrium construct
that emerged from his theoretical approach.
The British tradition during this time con-
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tinued to place little emphasis on the entrepre-
neur, dominated as it was by Marshall and
Pigou. This tendency continued with their pupil,
John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), in whose
writings entrepreneurs play no major role what-
soever. In fact, Keynes (1964, 162) reduces
entrepreneurial activities to the alleged “animal
spirits” that drive certain people to seek profit,
a contention that adds nothing to the economic
insights of his predecessors.
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Intellectual intercourse in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries flowed in
one direction: from Europe, and especially
Germany, to America. This was unfortunate
because many American economists had made
advances in the theory of entrepreneurship
from which their European counterparts might
have profited. Among them were Amasa Walker
(1799–1875), Francis Walker (1840–97), John
Bates Clark (1847–1938), Frank Taussig (1859–
1940), Herbert Davenport (1861–1931), and
Frank Knight (1885–1972). Not since the Physio-
crats had so much work been done on the topic
of entrepreneurship, especially as it relates to
entrepreneurs bearing risk and uncertainty.
These writers also extensively explored whether
entrepreneurs and capitalists are identical or
whether they perform separate functions in the
economy.
Davenport in particular made some inter-
esting contentions, extending Cantillon’s belief
that entrepreneurs bear risk because they don’t
know what output can be sold for, nor even
what their future input costs might be. Further,
Davenport contended that entrepreneurs are the
engine of capitalist production and, for that rea-
son, economics ought to be the study of what
they do (Hebert and Link 1988).
Davenport, like Clark and others before
them, denied that profit is a return to risk bear-
ing, arguing instead that profits are just a form
of entrepreneurial wages paid for the specific
managerial/visionary attributes of entrepre-
neurs. Davenport’s entrepreneurs are not like
Schumpeter’s innovators who are busy trans-
forming the economic landscape through cre-
ative destruction. They are equilibrators, the
restorers of equilibrium, rather than disequili-
brators; hence, Davenport anticipates Kirzner’s
(1973) arguments.
Knight, in his famous 1921 work Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit, succeeded in carefully
delineating the modern contours of the theory
of the entrepreneur. Knight’s distinction be-
tween risk and uncertainty has since been ex-
panded, but his work was pioneering, nonethe-
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about the economic risk bearing (now called
uncertainty) that is one of the entrepreneur’s
primary functions in the economy (Knight 1971,
270–90). Knight’s view of this aspect of entre-
preneurial function and its reward—profit, as
he defined it—is summed up succinctly in the
following passage:
Profit arises out of the inherent,
absolute unpredictability of things, out of
the sheer brute fact that the results of
human activity cannot be anticipated and
then only insofar as even a probability
calculation in regard to them is impossi-
ble and meaningless. The receipt of profit
in a particular case may be argued to be
the result of superior judgment. But it is
judgment of judgment, especially one’s
own judgment, and in an individual case
there is no way of telling good judgment
from luck, and a succession of cases suf-
ficient to evaluate the judgment or deter-
mine its probable value transforms the
profit into a wage.
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Entrepreneurs receive their profits from
what we call uncertainty. It can’t be insured
against as risk can because it is inherently
unknowable. And the public policy implication
of this type of uncertainty is important, as F. A.
Hayek (1969, 203) was to point out: “To assume
that it is possible to create conditions of full
competition without making those who are
responsible for the decisions pay for their mis-
takes seems to be pure illusion.” In brief, entre-
preneurs are rewarded by markets when they
are right and show superior judgment, but pun-
ished when they are wrong, a process that
rearranges resources continuously in search of
greater use efficiency.
CONTRIBUTIONS SINCE SCHUMPETER
The middle twentieth century saw little
extension of existing ideas about entrepreneurs
and entrepreneurship, perhaps because of a
belief that Schumpeter had said it all. But one
significant development, “the socialist calcula-
tion debate,” merits attention because it re-
volved around the entrepreneur as the central
driving force of capitalist process (Hayek 1975,
Lavoie 1985).
Sparking the debate was a Mises article
(along with one the same year by the famous
sociologist Max Weber) that suggested socialism
wouldn’t work in practice because, absent a
market for capital, socialist planners wouldn’t
be able to value inputs or outputs rationally
(Mises 1975). As much methodological as ideo-
logical, the diverse positions helped clarify
many unexamined assumptions and issues in
then-current economic theory. Schumpeter,
who had already decided that socialism lay at
the end of the capitalist development road
because capitalism’s successes create its own
eventual downfall, opposed Mises, as did Fred
Taylor, Abba Lerner, and Oscar Lange. Mises’
argument was picked up and extended by his
close associate F. A. Hayek (1899–1992). The
debate produced two competing views of 
economics and human society in which the 
role and function of entrepreneurs had never
been more visible, central, or important. Sev-
eral variants of entrepreneurship theory also
emerged from this clash, including the one
stressed and developed by Austrians and their
sympathizers, such as Hayek himself, Murray
Rothbard (1926–93), G. L. S. Shackle (1903–92),
Ludwig Lachmann (1906–90), and Israel Kirzner
(1930– ).
Fundamental to the clash between the
pro- and antisocialist planning protagonists was
the issue of equilibrium and how an economy
solves the problem of matching rational, cost-
minimizing production of goods and services
with consumer preferences. For the proplan-
ning writers, the solution was simple: formu-
lating a system of equations and then solving
them, taking existing preferences and prices 
as given data (Lange 1964; but see also
Schumpeter 1968, 989, and Hayek 1975,
Appendix A). Entrepreneurs aren’t necessary in
this model of how to determine an economy’s
output. Not surprisingly, the Austrians took the
lead in picking apart the implications of the pro-
planning approach and began to create a model
of the capitalist economy as an ongoing process
of discovery, such discoveries being the daily
by-product of entrepreneurial activity (Kirzner
1992). As Holcombe (1988) writes:
These activities [research and
development] can augment factors of
production, but by themselves do not
provide the insights that lead to new
goods and services, or new processes for
producing existing goods and services. If
this seems like an overly fine distinction,
consider the policy implications. Centrally
planned economies tried unsuccessfully
for decades to produce growth through
investment in research and education,
but were missing the institutions that
enabled entrepreneurship.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 8
It is entrepreneurs—dispersed, alert and
making use of decentralized information—who
coordinate economic activity, bring new
processes to fruition, combine labor and capital
in new or proven ways, and create their indi-
vidual pieces out of which the economy’s over-
all, aggregate direction emerges.
14 There is
another important but often overlooked advan-
tage to having decentralized entrepreneurs con-
trol the economy’s overall direction. Decentral-
ized decisions minimize the harm poor choices
can do to the entire economy. Central planning
has no such advantage. When the national plan-
ners are wrong, the entire economy suffers.
WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED EQUILIBRIUM?
For many writers, the socialist planning
debate, as well as the history of the theory of
entrepreneurship, depended on the definition
of equilibrium, a much-used but often insuffi-
ciently defined concept. What precisely does
the term mean, and why does it impact various
theories so much? (See Kirzner 2000, chapter 13.)
Palgrave’s definition stresses the Austrian
contention about the correctness of market par-
ticipants’ plans:
Economic equilibrium, at least as the
term has traditionally been used, has
always implied an outcome, typically
from the application of some inputs, that
conforms to the expectations of the par-
ticipants in the economy. Many theorists,
especially those employing the “eco-
nomic man” postulate, have also re-
quired the further condition for equilib-
rium that every participant be optimizing
in relation to those correct expectations.
However, it is the former condition, cor-
rect expectations, that appears to be the
essential property of equilibrium at least
in the orthodox use of the term. (Eatwell,
Milgate, and Newman 1987, 177) [Empha-
sis added]
Thus, we have a contrast between physi-
cal equilibria in an at-rest position, as in a pen-
dulum at rest, and the expectational equilibria
in economics that don’t imply rest at all, but a
process of fulfilled expectations. This view also
implies that equilibrium is something the econ-
omy has a tendency to move toward, like “the
centre of gravitation of the economic system—
it is that configuration of values towards which
all economic magnitudes are continually tend-
ing to conform” (Eatwell, Milgate and Newman
1987, 179). Does it matter whether we view
entrepreneurs as disrupting pre-existing equilib-
ria or as creating new equilibria?
15 It doesn’t, so
long as we remember that the concept of gen-
eral equilibrium is purely theoretical, has never
existed and will never exist. Whether there is, in
fact, a tendency toward general equilibrium is a
discussion beyond the scope of this article. In
the physical world, an existing “state of affairs”
can be disrupted by entrepreneurial activities
even as other entrepreneurs act so as to better
coordinate the interrelationships between inven-
tors, producers, financiers, and consumers that
the initial disruption created, thus triggering a
process that ends in a new and different state of
affairs and so on. Therefore, the differing entre-
preneurial definitions of equilibrium are recon-
cilable if we view the concepts “equilibrating”
and “disequilibrating” as variations on the cen-
tral theme of market process rather than as dia-
metrically opposed absolutes.
WHAT ABOUT PUBLIC POLICY AND
ENTREPRENEURS?
Understanding the development of the
concept of entrepreneurship helps us to better
understand our economy and the policy choices
that are consistent with maximizing the benefits
we derive from the work done by entrepre-
neurs. This is especially true during periods of
upheaval and transition, when the old formulas
and measurement devices are called into ques-
tion because the very nature of what is being
measured is changing or has already changed.
The current controversies over such empirical
issues as measuring productivity, explaining
widely divergent and sometimes surprising
growth rates, and setting the speed at which the
economy can grow without triggering inflation
are all dependent in many intricate ways on
what entrepreneurs are doing in—and to—
the economy. As Greenspan (2000) noted in
congressional testimony:
As the U.S. economy enters a new
century as well as a new year, the time is
opportune to reflect on the basic charac-
teristics of our economic system that have
brought about our success in recent years.
Competitive and open markets, the rule
of law, fiscal discipline, and a culture of
enterprise and entrepreneurship should
continue to undergird rapid innovation
and enhanced productivity that in turn
should foster a sustained further rise in
living standards. [Emphasis added]9 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 2001
In the New Economy—with the always
evolving microprocessor and its myriad applica-
tions, biotech, and nanotechnologic possibili-
ties—the seemingly simple concepts “input”
and  “output” are no longer simple. The Old
Economy definitions are changing as these new
technologies transform how we produce things.
During an entrepreneurially driven, transforma-
tional time—and some economists argue that
this is just such a time—our theories and mea-
surements might undergo a period of Kuhnian
“anomaly.” If so, we could find our theories trans-
formed by “extraordinary science,” and the claims
for change that at first are resisted and attacked
might ultimately become a new status quo.
16
The logical conclusion from this explora-
tion is that an entrepreneur is an ingenious, risk
taking innovator who might also be an imagi-
native manager and whose actions both disrupt
and coordinate our market economy. We can, of
course, limit the scope of entrepreneurial activ-
ity in any economy. But we do so only by bear-
ing the social costs of less innovation, slower
growth, and curtailment of our economic free-
dom. This is always the primary regulatory
trade-off—that regulations raise costs, tend to
entrench existing technologies at the expense of
newer ones, and raise legal barriers to entry by
entrepreneurs wishing to compete in those mar-
kets. Thus, we would do well to heed the argu-
ments of the writers surveyed in this article con-
cerning entrepreneurs and their vital role as not
only the engine of capitalist process, but of cap-
italist progress as well.
Several of the contentions explored above
were forcefully stated by former U.S. Treasury
Secretary Lawrence Summers (Henig 2000):
What evolution teaches you is that
improvements in innovation come in
many different forms. That evolution is
an invisible-hand process rather than a
guiding-hand process. So it inclines one
toward a set of public policies that support
a very dynamic and competitive econ-
omy with a lot of different people trying
to do a lot of different things, rather than
an approach of trying to have people in
an office figuring out what’s right and
laying out a blueprint for the future.
The essence of the Newtonian sys-
tem was that you could predict where
Saturn would be in A.D. 3800. The
essence of a Darwinian system is that
you can’t make the same kind of predic-
tions. And I think that imparts a certain
humility to government as we make eco-
nomic policy. On the one hand, it in-
clines us toward deregulation, and on
the other hand, it teaches us that the
broadest environment is the best para-
meter in which evolution is allowed to
operate….It’s not an accident that Silicon
Valley happened in the United States
rather than someplace else, it’s a reflec-
tion of American public policy.
In the very competitive, global market-
place, nations that forget how their entrepre-
neurs contribute to technological change, pro-
ductivity, resource efficiencies, and economic
growth do so at a potentially high cost
(Drozdiak 2001).
NOTES
The author thanks Mark Wynne, Jim Dolmas, Jason
Saving, Harvey Rosenblum, Steve Brown, Erwan
Quintin, and Evan Koenig for their helpful comments.
1 Wolfe’s (2000, 17–65) essay “Two Young Men Who
Went West” captures, in a way that theory could never
duplicate, the combination of chance, motive, attitude,
and ability that created Silicon Valley and is a consis-
tently fascinating examination of America’s remarkable
predilection for creating and nurturing entrepreneurs.
2 Elkjaer (1991, 805), quoting Bloch and Wartburg
(1950). An even more detailed analysis of the linguistic
origins of the term entrepreneur and its use pre-
Cantillon is given by Hoselitz (1962).
3 Elkjaer (1991, 805), quoting Helene Verin.
4 Numerous others considered the new science an
A Useful Taxonomy of Entrepreneurial Ideas
Concept Agreeing Disagreeing
Risk bearing Cantillon, Say, Knight Schumpeter,
(Mises, Menger, Shackle) Kirzner
Capital owning Physiocrats, Smith Walras, Clark,
(Turgot, Mises) Schumpeter, Kirzner




Combiner of factors, Walras, Clark Marshall, Say,
but not a leader Mill
Creates equilibrium Walras, Clark Schumpeter
(Shultz)




More alert Cantillon, Clark, Kirzner Physiocrats
(Menger)
SOURCE: Based on Elkjaer (1991), with author’s additions in parentheses.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 10
avocation, including Dupuit, Turgot, Smith, Ricardo,
Malthus, and Jevons.
5 Rothbard 1995a, 395. “Cantillon’s theory…had failed 
in one key element: an analysis of capital and the
realization that the major driving force is not just any
entrepreneur but the capitalist-entrepreneur, the man
who combines both functions.”
6 This was due, in part, to Charles Gide and Charles
Rist’s influential A History of Economic Doctrines, first
published in 1915. Hoselitz (1962, 234) states that it
was not until the seventh edition of Gide and Rist’s
book that they finally gave credit to the Physiocrats
and Cantillon, thus changing the claim that this con-
cept had never before appeared in the economics
literature. But the sixth printing, cited in this article
(Gide and Rist 1927), does not credit Say with author-
ship of this key economic concept either. Gide and
Rist surely were familiar with the history of develop-
ment of French political economy, making the error all
the more inexplicable.
7 The Liberty Press reissue of the 1976 Oxford edition of
The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1981) contains no index
entry for the term entrepreneur. Smith’s reputation
among economists has had its highs and lows. Since
the bicentennial of his magnum opus in 1976, his
reputation has been rising once again, having survived
much criticism. See, for example, Schumpeter’s strong
criticisms of “A. Smith” in his History of Economic
Analysis.
8 If Ricardo had questions about Say’s views, he could
have had them answered authoritatively, since the two
men carried on a correspondence. But the word “entre-
preneur” appears nowhere in that correspondence.
9 Not everyone agrees that the British classical econo-
mists, for the most part, ignored entrepreneurship. 
See Machovec (1995), chapters 4, 5, and 6.
10 Mill (1976, 406). Mill clearly meant “entrepreneur” in
this passage, even footnoting it and lamenting that, in
French, it was better stated, although he still used the
more familiar English term “undertaker.”
11 Schumpeter’s definition of entrepreneurs and their
activities is mostly found in his Theory of Economic
Development (1961), although it is restated in his
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1950,
132–33). See also Mises (1963, 559–63) for a discus-
sion on entrepreneurial errors. Schumpeter’s vision of
creation on the remnants of destruction was not new.
The American economist David A. Wells’ 1889 book,
Recent Economic Changes, argued the same theme
but without the catchy phrase “creative destruction”
and without discussing in depth its implications, as
Schumpeter did. See Perelman (1995).
12 Not all British economists ignored the role of entrepre-
neurs. See Wicksteed (1967, 367–71).
13 Knight (1971, 311). This distinction is related to Mises’
discussion of case and class probabilities and insur-
ance. See Mises (1963, 107–15). However, Mises had
an especially difficult theory of the entrepreneur, and
space does not permit a detailed examination of the
differences between that conception and the general
use of the term. See, however, Gunning (2001).
14 It seems difficult to believe that, between 1936 and
1945, Hayek published three short essays that
revealed just how confused the economics profession
was about this constellation of important issues, but
see his Individualism and Economic Order (1969),
chapters 2, 3, and 4.
15 Lewin’s (1999) discussion of this issue in the first three
chapters of Capital in Disequilibrium, and many other
aspects of the historical disagreements about what
equilibrium has meant to various theorists, is well
worth consulting.
16 After Kuhn’s (1962) knowledge model as put forth in
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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